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Design of Differentially Private Dynamic
Controllers
Yu Kawano and Ming Cao
Abstract—As a quantitative criterion for privacy of “mecha-
nisms” in the form of data-generating processes, the concept of
differential privacy was first proposed in computer science and
has later been applied to linear dynamical systems. However,
differential privacy has not been studied in depth together
with other properties of dynamical systems, and it has not
been fully utilized for controller design. In this paper, first we
clarify that a classical concept in systems and control, input
observability (sometimes referred to as left invertibility) has a
strong connection with differential privacy. In particular, we show
that the Gaussian mechanism can be made highly differentially
private by adding small noise if the corresponding system is less
input observable. Next, enabled by our new insight into privacy,
we develop a method to design dynamic controllers for a tracking
problem while addressing privacy concerns. We call the designed
controller as such the differentially private controller. The usage of
such controllers is further illustrated by solving a power supply
problem in a DC microgrid with smart meters where privacy
issues are of concern.
Index Terms—Discrete-time linear systems, Differential Pri-
vacy, Observability, Private Controller
I. INTRODUCTION
Along with the rapid development of the Internet-of-Things
(IoT) and cloud computing technologies, privacy and security
are becoming social issues, see e.g. [1]–[7]. In order to protect
the privacy of data sources, the collected data are usually pro-
cessed statistically before being used in different applications.
However, even if one only publishes statistical analytics, not
raw data, there is still possibility that personal information can
be identified by exploiting third party information. Motivated
by threats on privacy, statistical disclosure control, or more
generally privacy preserving data mining have been intensively
studied; see e.g. [8], [9]. Representative techniques include
the K-anonymity [10], l-diversity [11], t-closeness [12], and
differential privacy [13], [14]. For instance, differential privacy
has been applied to various problems arising in domains of
smart grids [15]–[17], health monitoring [18], [19], blockchain
(or bitcoin) [20], [21] and mechanism design [22] in different
problem settings with different adjacency relationships and
noises.
In practical applications, instead of being discussed as an
issue for static data sets, privacy in fact needs to be treated
as a critical property for dynamical systems; for example,
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individual’s electricity consumption patterns are captured by
dynamical data evolving with time and used for stabiliza-
tion of power systems. In order to address privacy issues
of datasets generated by dynamical systems, the concept of
differential privacy has been applied to discrete-time linear
dynamical systems, see e.g. [23], [24]. These papers illustrate
that the key idea of differential privacy, adding noise to date
before publishing them, is effective for privacy protection
for not only static but also dynamical data sets. However,
differential privacy, especially its relationship to dynamical
systems’ properties, has not yet been well studied even in view
of the fact that differential privacy itself has been analyzed
systematically; see e.g. [25].
Following the approach that is deeply rooted in systems
and control theory, we study privacy of dynamical systems
by taking two major steps: studying privacy in terms of input
observability and then providing a private controller design
method. The differential privacy level of a discrete-time linear
system can be interpreted as a quantitative criterion for the
difficulty of estimating its input. In systems and control, the
property for uniquely determining the input from the output
is called input observability [26] or left invertibility [27].
For input observability, there are already several qualitative
criteria, e.g. the rank condition of the transfer function matrix,
the PBH type test [26], [28], and Kalman’s rank type con-
ditions [27], [29]. However, these existing conditions do not
provide quantitative analysis. Therefore, there is a gap between
the relatively new concept of differential privacy and the
classical concept of input observability. In order to establish
a bridge between differential privacy and input observability,
we extend the concept of the Gramian to input observability.
Then, we show that the Gaussian mechanism evaluates the
maximum eigenvalue of the input observability Gramian. In
other words, small noise is enough to make the less input
observable Gaussian mechanism highly differentially private.
This new insight suggests that the input observability Gramian
can be used for detailed privacy analysis (not restricted to
differential privacy though) as the standard controllability
and observability Gramians do for detailed controllability and
observability analysis.
Next, we consider to achieve trajectory tracking by pro-
tecting private information. Trajectory tracking itself has been
studied as a part of the output regulation problem [30] in which
dynamic output feedback controllers have been proposed. The
differential privacy level increases if the dynamic controllers
are designed such that the maximum eigenvalue of the input
observability Gramian is small, which is achieved by making
the correspondingH∞-norm small. In this paper, we provide a
dynamic controller design method for addressing the tracking
problem and specifying the H∞-norm simultaneously based
on LMIs. It is worth pointing out that in order to increase the
differential privacy level of the controller, one needs to make
the H∞-norm of the controller small or add large noise. Both
of them can deteriorate the control performance. Therefore
differentially private controller design reduces to a trade-off
between the privacy level and control performance.
In the context of the design of differentially private con-
trollers we just formulated, there are related works. Differential
privacy has been employed for private filtering design [23],
[24], but not for controller design. The paper [23] also studies
the connection between differential privacy and the H∞-
norm of the system; however, differential privacy has not
been studied from the input observability perspective, which
was considered in our preliminary conference version [31].
Different from [23], [31], we consider not just i.i.d. noise,
which may seem a minor technical extension, but this is in
fact an important step towards obtaining deeper understanding
of the differential privacy level of a dynamical system. On
the other hand, differential privacy has been used for LQ
control [32] and distributed optimization [33]–[37], where
the controller gains or dynamics are designed without taking
privacy issues into account, and then noise is added to the
designed controller in order to achieve the prescribed privacy
level. In contrast, we design the controller itself to make the
system highly private by adding small noise.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II introduces the concept of differential privacy and
analyzes it from several aspects including input observability.
Section III provides a differentially private controller design
method. Our method is illustrated by an example of DC
microgrids with smart meters. Section V briefly mentions
extensions of our results to nonlinear systems, where a part
of the results has been presented in a preliminary conference
version [38]. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
Notations: The set of real numbers, non-negative real num-
bers, and non-negative integers are denoted by R, R+ and Z+,
respectively. For vectors x1, . . . , xm ∈ Rn, a collective vector
[x⊤1 · · · x⊤m]⊤ ∈ Rnm is also described by [x1; · · · ;xm] for
the sake of simplicity of description. For sequence u(t) ∈ Rm,
t ∈ Z+, a collective vector consisting of its subsequence is
denoted by Ut(τ) := [u(τ); · · · ;u(τ+ t)] ∈ R
(t+1)m by using
a capital alphabet. When τ = 0, the argument is omitted, i.e.,
Ut := [u(0); · · · ;u(t)]. For a square matrix A ∈ Rn×n, its
determinant is denoted by det(A). Also, its maximum and
minimum eigenvalues are denoted by λmax(A) and λmin(A),
respectively. For a square matrix A ∈ Rn×n, A ≻ 0 means
that A is symmetric and positive definite. The identity matrix
of size n is denoted by In. For vector x ∈ Rn, its norms is
denoted by |x|p := (
∑n
i=1 |xi|
p)
1/p
, where p ∈ Z+. Also, its
weighted norm with A ≻ 0 is denoted by |x|A := (x⊤Ax)1/2.
A continuous function α : [0, a) → R+ is said to be of
class K if it is strictly increasing and α(0) = 0. Moreover,
it is said to be of class K∞ if a = ∞ and α(r) → ∞ as
r →∞. A random variable w is said to have a non-degenerate
multivariate Gaussian distribution with the mean value µ ∈ Rn
and Σ ≻ 0, denoted by w ∼ Nn(µ,Σ), if its distribution has
the following probability density
p(w;µ,Σ) =
(
1
(2pi)ndet(Σ)
)1/2
e−|w−µ|
2
Σ−1
/2.
The so called Q-function is defined by Q(w) :=
1√
2pi
∫∞
w e
− v22 dv, where Q(w) < 1/2 for w > 0, and
R(ε, δ) := (Q−1(δ) +
√
(Q−1(δ))2 + 2ε)/2ε.
II. DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY ANALYSIS
In this section, we study privacy of the discrete-time linear
dynamical systems from three aspects. First, we study differ-
ential privacy [13], [14] of a Gaussian mechanism with output
noise; the exact definition of a mechanism will become clear
later. Second, we investigate differential privacy of the mecha-
nism in terms of observability. Finally, we analyze differential
privacy of the mechanism with input noise. Throughout the
paper, we focus on a finite data set as typically studied
in differential privacy. In a dynamical system setting, this
corresponds to analyzing properties within a finite time.
Consider the following discrete-time linear system:{
x(t+ 1) = Ax(t) +Bu(t),
y(t) = Cx(t) +Du(t),
(1)
for t ∈ Z+, where x(t) ∈ Rn, u(t) ∈ Rm and y(t) ∈ Rq
denote the state, input and output, respectively, andA ∈ Rn×n,
B ∈ Rn×m, C ∈ Rq×n and D ∈ Rq×m.
By using the system dynamics (1), the output sequence Yt ∈
R
(t+1)q can be described as
Yt = Otx0 +NtUt, (2)
where Ot ∈ R(t+1)q×n and Nt ∈ R(t+1)q×(t+1)m are
Ot :=
[
C⊤ CA⊤ · · · (CAt)⊤
]
, (3)
Nt :=


D 0 · · · · · · 0
CB D
. . .
...
CAB CB D
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
. . . 0
CAt−1B CAt−2B · · · CB D


. (4)
To facilitate future discussion, we also denote the first left
(t+ 1)q by (T + 1)m submatrix of Nt by Nt,T , T ≤ t.
A. Differential Privacy With Output Noise
In order to proceed with differential privacy analysis, we
consider a new output with noise w(t) ∈ Rq: yw(t) := y(t)+
w(t). From (2), Yw,t ∈ R(t+1)q can be described as
Yw,t = Otx0 +NtUt +Wt. (5)
This defines a mapping M : Rn × R(t+1)m × R(t+1)q ∋
(x0, Ut,Wt) 7→ Yw,t ∈ R
(t+1)q . In differential privacy
analysis, this mapping is called a mechanism [13], [14].
It is worth mentioning that the terminology “input” can be
confusing since it is used in both the dynamical system (1) and
the induced mechanism (5). The input data of the mechanism
is (x0, Ut).
Remark 2.1: Depending on the problem, both x0 and Ut are
not necessarily private. Our results can readily be extended to
the scenario where either x0 or Ut is confidential, and the
other is public. ⊳
Differential privacy gives an index of the privacy level
of a mechanism, which is characterized by the sensitivity
of published output data Yw,t with respect to input data
(x0, Ut). More specifically, if for a different pair of input
data ((x10, U
1
t ), (x
2
0, U
2
t )), the corresponding pair of output
data (Y 1w,t, Y
2
w,t) are very different, then one can conclude
that input data is easy to estimate, i.e. the mechanism is less
private. For such a reason, differential privacy is defined by
using a different but “similar” data pair, where by similar we
mean that they satisfy the following adjacency relations.
Definition 2.2: Given c > 0 and p ∈ Z+, a pair of
input data ((x10, U
1
t ), (x
2
0, U
2
t )) ∈ (R
n × R(t+1)m) × (Rn ×
R
(t+1)m) is said to be Adjcp((x
1
0, U
1
t ), (x
2
0, U
2
t )) if |[x
1
0;U
1
t ]−
[x20;U
2
t ]|p ≤ c. ⊳
The value c gives an upper bound on the distance (or
similarity) of pairs of input data sets (x10, U
1
t ) and (x
2
0, U
2
t ).
Therefore, c is decided based on the range of input data sets, in
which one wants to make the input data difficult to distinguish.
Now, we are ready to define differential privacy of the
mechanism.
Definition 2.3: Let (R(t+1)q,F) be a measurable space.
The mechanism (5) is said to be (ε, δ)-differentially private
for Adjcp((x
1
0, U
1
t ), (x
2
0, U
2
t )) at a finite time instant t if there
exist ε > 0 and δ ≥ 0 such that
P(Otx
1
0 +NtU
1
t +Wt ∈ S)
≤ eεP(Otx
2
0 +NtU
2
t +Wt ∈ S) + δ, ∀S ∈ F (6)
for any ((x10, U
1
t ), (x
2
0, U
2
t )) ∈ Adj
c
p((x
1
0, U
1
t ), (x
2
0, U
2
t )). ⊳
Remark 2.4: There are two minor differences between Def-
inition 2.2 and the symmetric binary relation in [23]. In [23],
only one element of a pair is allowed to be different, and only
the input u is considered. Next, our definition of differential
privacy is a direct extension of the original one [13], [14]
and slightly different from that defined for linear dynamical
systems in [23]; our definition depends on the initial state
in addition to the input sequence, and Wt is not necessarily
causal. ⊳
If ε and δ are large, then for a different pair of input data
((x10, U
1
t ), (x
2
0, U
2
t )), the corresponding pair of probability
distributions of output data (Y 1w,t, Y
2
w,t) is very different, i.e.,
a mechanism is less private. Therefore, the privacy level of
a mechanism is evaluated by the pair of variables ε and δ.
From its definition, one notices that if a mechanism is (ε1, δ1)-
differentially private, then it is (ε2, δ2)-differentially private
for any ε2 ≥ ε1 and δ2 ≥ δ1. Therefore, ε and δ give a lower
bound on the privacy level, where larger ε and δ mean being
less private.
As clear from the definition, ε and δ also depend on
noise. In fact, we show that the sensitivity of the dynami-
cal system (1) provides the lower bound on the covariance
matrix for the multivariate Gaussian noise to achieve (ε, δ)-
differential privacy as follows as a generalization of [14], [23,
Theorem 3]; a mechanism with Gaussian noise is called a
Gaussian mechanism.
Theorem 2.5: The Gaussian mechanism (5) induced by
Wt ∼ N(t+1)q(µ,Σ) is (ε, δ)-differentially private for
Adjc2((x
1
0, U
1
t ), (x
2
0, U
2
t )) at a finite time t with ε > 0 and
1/2 > δ > 0 if the covariance matrix Σ ≻ 0 is chosen as
λ−1/2max (OΣ,t) ≥ cR(ε, δ), (7)
OΣ,t :=
[
Ot Nt
]⊤
Σ−1
[
Ot Nt
]
. (8)
Proof: In a similar manner as [23, Theorem 3], for
arbitrary ε > 0, we have
P(Otx
1
0 +NtU
1
t +Wt ∈ S)
≤ eεP(Otx
2
0 +NtU
2
t +Wt ∈ S) + P
(
W˜ ≥ εz − 1/2z
)
,
z := |Ot(x
2
0 − x
1
0) +Nt(U
2
t − U
1
t )|
−1
Σ−1 ,
where W˜ ∼ N (0, 1). Then, the mechanism is (ε, δ)-
differentially private if Q
(
εz − 12z
)
≤ δ, i.e.
z ≥ R(ε, δ), (9)
for any ((x10, U
1
t ), (x
2
0, U
2
t )) ∈ Adj
c
2((x
1
0, U
1
t ), (x
2
0, U
2
t )). The
inequality (9) holds if (7) is satisfied because
z−1 =|Ot(x20 − x
1
0) +Nt(U
2
t − U
1
t )|Σ−1 ≤ cλ
1/2
max (OΣ,t)
holds.
In a scenario where the initial state or input sequence is pub-
lic, the condition (8) can be replaced by λ
−1/2
max (N⊤t Σ−1Nt) ≥
cR(ε, δ) and λ
−1/2
max (O⊤t Σ
−1Ot) ≥ cR(ε, δ), respectively. For
any given c, ε > 0 and 1/2 > δ > 0, one can make the
Gaussian mechanism (ε, δ)-differentially private if one designs
the covariance matrix Σ sufficiently large such that (7) holds.
One notices that only the matrix
[
Ot Nt
]
depends on the
system dynamics (1). We analyze this matrix in terms of input
observability in the next subsection.
Remark 2.6: Since noise is added to output, the output data
itself is made private. In order to analyze its differential privacy
level, one can employ the conventional results in [13], [14].
For both input and output, one can achieve the prescribed
differential privacy levels by adding sufficiently large noise.
Therefore, if one designs noise based on the stronger privacy
requirement between input and output, then the other privacy
requirement is also satisfied. ⊳
Remark 2.7: In a special scenario where Σ = σ2I(t+1)q ,
σ > 0 (an i.i.d. Gaussian noise), we have
σ ≥ cλ1/2max
(
OI(t+1)q ,t
)
R(ε, δ). (10)
Still one can design σ to make the Gaussian mechanism (ε, δ)-
differentially private for arbitrary ε > 0 and 1/2 > δ > 0. ⊳
Remark 2.8: One can also extend [23, Theorem 2] to the
i.i.d. Laplace noise to our problem setting. However, the
extension to the multivariate Laplace noise is not clear because
this involves the computation of the modified Bessel function
of the second kind. Let wi(t), i = 1, . . . , q, t ∈ Z+ be an
i.i.d. Laplace noise with variance µ ∈ R and distribution b > 0.
Then, the Laplace mechanism (5) is (ε, 0)-differentially private
for Adjc1((x
1
0, U
1
t ), (x
2
0, U
2
t )) at a finite time t with ε > 0 if
b ≥ c
∣∣[ Ot Nt ]∣∣1 /ε,
where |A|1 = maxj
∑
i |ai,j | is the induced matrix 1-norm.
As for the Gaussian mechanism, an induced matrix norm
of
[
Ot Nt
]
plays a crucial role for the Laplace mechanism
too. In the next subsection, we study its 2-norm in terms of
input observability. Because of the equivalence of induced
matrix norms, the observation for the 2-norm is applicable
to an arbitrary norm including the 1-norm. ⊳
Note that in Theorem 2.5, the system (1) is not necessarily
stable. Now, we focus on the asymptotically stable case. Then,
one can characterize the differentially privacy level in terms
of the H∞-norm and the observability Gramian, where the
H∞-norm of the system (1) is the infimum positive constant
γ satisfying∑t
τ=0 |y(τ)|
2
2 ≤ γ
2
∑t
τ=0 |u(τ)|
2
2, ∀t ∈ Z+,
and the observability Gramian is
O∞ := O⊤∞O∞ =
∑∞
t=0(CA
t)⊤(CAt), (11)
where Ot is defined in (3). Note that λmax(O
⊤
t Ot) is non-
decreasing with respect to t ∈ Z+, and for the asymptotically
stable system, O∞ is finite. Now, we obtain the following
result as a corollary of Theorem 2.5. If x0 is public and
the multivariate Gaussian is i.i.d, the following result reduces
to [23, Corollary 1].
Corollary 2.9: The Gaussian mechanism (5) induced by an
asymptotically stable system (1) and Wt ∼ N(t+1)q(µ,Σ) is
(ε, δ)-differentially private for Adjc2((x
1
0, U
1
t ), (x
2
0, U
2
t )) at a
finite time t with ε > 0 and 1/2 > δ > 0 if the covariance
matrix Σ ≻ 0 is chosen as
λ
1/2
min(Σ) ≥ c
(
λ
1/2
max(O∞) + γ
)
R(ε, δ). (12)
Proof: Compute
|Ot(x
2
0 − x
1
0) +Nt(U
2
t − U
1
t )|Σ−1
≤ |Ot(x
2
0 − x
1
0)|Σ−1 + |Nt(U
2
t − U
1
t )|Σ−1
≤ λ1/2max(Σ
−1)(|Ot(x20 − x
1
0)|2 + |Nt(U
2
t − U
1
t )|2)
≤ cλ
1/2
max(Σ−1)
(
λ
1/2
max(O∞) + γ
)
.
Therefore, (12) implies (9), where 1/λmax(Σ
−1) = λmin(Σ)
is used.
In a scenario where the initial state or input sequence is
public, the condition (12) can be replaced by λ
1/2
min(Σ) ≥
cγR(ε, δ) and λ
1/2
min(Σ) ≥ cλ
1/2
max(O∞)R(ε, δ), respectively.
Form the proof, one notices that for an asymptotically stable
systems (1), if the covariance matrix Σ is chosen such that
(12) holds, then (7) holds for any t ∈ Z+. That is, for
every asymptotically stable system and for any ε > 0 and
1/2 > δ > 0, there exists a non-degenerate multivariate
Gaussian noise which makes the induced mechanism (ε, δ)-
differentially private for any t ∈ Z+. However, this is not
always true for unstable systems; a similar statement can be
found in [39, Theorem 4.5].
B. Connection with Strong Input Observability
In the previous subsection, we have studied the (ε, δ)-
differential privacy of a Gaussian mechanism induced by
output noise. However, it is not intuitively clear how private the
input data is from the (ε, δ) pair and how differential privacy
relates with dynamical systems’ properties. In differential
privacy, noise is designed in order to prevent the initial state
and input sequence from being determined from the published
output sequence. From the systems and control point of view,
the property of determining the initial state and input sequence
can be interpreted as observability or left invertibility [26],
[27]. In this subsection, we consider to study the Gaussian
mechanism from the input observability aspect.
First, we define strong input observability studied in this
paper.
Definition 2.10: The system (1) is said to be strongly input
observable if there exists T ∈ Z+ such that both the initial
state x0 ∈ Rn and initial input u(0) ∈ Rm are uniquely
determined from the measured output sequence YT . ⊳
It is worth mentioning that if (x0, u(0)) is uniquely deter-
mined from YT , then (x(k), u(k)) is uniquely determined from
YT+k, k = 1, 2, . . . . Hence, one can focus on (x0, u(0)) in the
definition of strong input observability. Note that strong input
observability can be a strong property; however, it is expected
that the number of strongly input observable systems will dra-
matically increase after IoT technologies are realized because
the main idea of IoT technologies is to collect large amounts
of information online, which is difficult to obtain otherwise,
by installing new measurement devices and networks.
Remark 2.11: There are several similar but different con-
cepts from strong input observability defined here. First, if
UT is known, the analysis reduces to determining the initial
state x0, i.e, the standard observability analysis [40]. When
UT is unknown, the property that x0 is uniquely determined
is called unknown-input (or strong) observability [41]. Next,
if x0 is known, the analysis reduces to determining the
initial input u(0); this property is called input observability
with the known initial state x0 [26] or left invertibility [27].
Finally, for unknown initial state x0, the property that the
initial input u(0) is uniquely determined is called input
observability [26]. Therefore, our strong input observability
requires both unknown-input (or strong) observability and
input observability. However, to the best of our knowledge,
the property uniquely determining both of the initial state and
initial input (x0, u(0)) has not been defined previously in the
literature. ⊳
The results in the existing observability analysis are helpful
for the strong input observability analysis. Especially, by
extending [27, Theorem 3], we have the following necessary
and sufficient condition for strong input observability. Since
the proof is similar, it is omitted.
Theorem 2.12: The system (1) is strongly input observable
if and only if
rank
[
O2n N2n,n
]
= n+ (n+ 1)m (13)
for Ot in (3) and the submatrix Nt,T of Nt in (4), i.e., the
matrix
[
O2n N2n,n
]
has the column full rank. ⊳
The following corollary is also used in this paper.
Corollary 2.13: The system (1) is strongly input observable
if and only if
rank
[
Ot Nt,T
]
= n+ (T + 1)m, (14)
for any integers T ≥ n and t ≥ T + n. ⊳
Proof: From the structures of Ot and Nt,T , if
[ O2n N2n,n ] has the column full rank, then
rank
[
O2n N2n,n
]
= rank
[
O2n+t N2n+t,n
]
for any t ∈ Z+. Conversely, from the Cayley-Hamilton
theorem [42], if
[
O2n+t N2n+t,n
]
has the column full
rank for some t ∈ Z+, then (13) holds.
The rank condition (13) or (14) is a qualitative criterion for
strong input observability, but differential privacy is a quanti-
tative criterion. A connection between these two concepts can
be established by extending the concept of the observability
Gramian to strong input observability because controllability
and observability Gramians give both quantitative and quali-
tative criteria. In order to extend the concept of the Gramian,
we consider a weighted least square estimation problem1 of
the initial state x0 and input sequences UT , T ≥ n from the
output sequence with the measurement noise, Yw,t, t ≥ T +n,
under a technical assumption u(τ) = 0, t ≥ τ > T :
J(x0,UT ) = min
(x0,UT )∈Rn×R(T+1)m
|Yw,t −Otx0 −Nt,TUT |
2
Σ−1 .
(15)
This problem has a unique solution if (14) holds, i.e., a system
is strongly input observable. The solution is[
xˆ0
UˆT
]
= (OΣ,t,T )
−1 [ Ot Nt,T ]⊤ Σ−1Yw,t, (16)
OΣ,t,T :=
[
Ot Nt,T
]⊤
Σ−1
[
Ot Nt,T
]
. (17)
If there is no measurement noise, i.e.,WT = 0, then (16) gives
the actual initial state and input sequence.
One notices that OΣ,t,t = OΣ,t for OΣ,t in (8). As for OΣ,t,
the matrix OΣ,t,T characterizes the differential privacy level
of a Gaussian mechanism, which we state as a corollary of
Theorem 2.5 without the proof.
Corollary 2.14: Let T ≥ n and t ≥ T + n. Then, the
Gaussian mechanism (5) induced by Wt ∼ N(t+1)q(µ,Σ) is
(ε, δ)-differentially private for Adjc2((x
1
0, U
1
t ), (x
2
0, U
2
t )) such
that u1(τ) = u2(τ), T < τ ≤ t at a finite time t with ε > 0
and 1/2 > δ > 0, if the covariance matrix Σ ≻ 0 is chosen as
λ
−1/2
max (OΣ,t,T ) ≥ cR(ε, δ) (18)
being hold. ⊳
Notice that if T = t, (18) is equivalent to (7). From (18),
Corollary 2.14 concludes that the differential privacy of the
Gaussian mechanism is characterized by the maximum eigen-
value of the matrix OΣ,t,T , where OΣ,t,T is not necessarily
non-singular in differential privacy analysis; non-singularity is
required in order to guarantee the uniqueness of a solution to
the least square estimation problem (15).
For Σ = I(t+1)q , we call Ot,T := OI(t+1)q ,t,T the strong
input observability Gramian. The strong input observability
Gramian is both a qualitative and quantitative criterion for
1Note that the controllability Gramian is originally obtained from the min-
imum energy control problem [43]. The duals of the controllability Gramian
and minimum energy control problem are respectively the observability
Gramian and least square estimation problem of the initial state.
strong input observability. For instance, from Corollary 2.13,
the system (1) is strongly input observable if and only if Ot,T
is non-singular for any integers T ≥ n and t ≥ n + T .
Also, from (16), if all eigenvalues of Ot,T is large, then
J(x0,UT ) in (16) with Σ = I(t+1)q is small. That is, (x0, UT )
is relatively easy to be estimated. This observation agrees
with (18) because for Σ = σ2I(t+1)q , large σ is required if
λmax(Ot,T ) is large; recall Remark 2.7. In other words, small
noise is enough to make the less input observable Gaussian
mechanism highly differentially private.
To gain deeper insight with respect to the privacy analysis,
we take a further look at the eigenvalues of the strong input
observability Gramian Ot,T from three aspects. First, from (3),
(4) and (17) with Σ = I(t+1)q , the ith m×m block diagonal
element of Ot,T is
(Ot,T )1,1 :=
∑t
k=0(CA
k)⊤CAk,
(Ot,T )i+1,i+1 := D
⊤D +
∑t−i−1
k=0 (CA
kB)⊤CAkB,
i = 1, 2, . . . , T,
where (Ot,T )T+1,T+1 := D⊤D when t = T . One notices
that (Ot,T )1,1 is the standard observability Gramian for the
initial state x0, and (Ot,T )i+1,i+1 can be viewed as the
observability Gramian corresponding to the initial input u(0),
which we call the initial input observability Gramian. From
the relation between the eigenvalues and the trace, the sum
of the eigenvalues of Ot,T is the sum of the eigenvalues of
all (Ot,T )i,i, i = 1, . . . , T + 1. Therefore, if the standard and
initial input observability Gramians have large eigenvalues, the
strong input observability Gramian Ot,T has large eigenvalues
also. In other words, the privacy level of the initial state and
whole input sequence is characterized by that of only the initial
state and initial input. This fact is natural because of two facts:
1) the output at each time instant contains the information of
the initial state and initial input, i.e. these are the least private
information; 2) if the initial state and initial input are uniquely
determined, the whole input sequence is uniquely determined.
Next, for fixed t, the minimum eigenvalue of Ot,T does not
increase with respect to T . For instance,
λmin(Ot,1) ≤ λmin(Ot,0). (19)
Recall that these two Gramians are obtained from the least
square estimation problems when u(t) = 0 for t = 2, 3, . . .
and t = 1, 2, . . . , respectively. Therefore, (19) corresponds to
a natural observation that u(0) is more difficult to estimate if
u(1) is unknown compared to the case when u(1) is known
to be 0.
Finally, for fixed T , λmax(Ot,T ) is non-decreasing with re-
spect to t, and thus ε in Corollary 2.14 is non-decreasing with
respect to t. This implies that as more data are being collected,
less private a mechanism becomes. It is worth emphasizing
that this observation is obtained when Σ = I(t+1)q , or more
generally Σ = σ2I(t+1)q , σ > 0, i.e., output noise is i.i.d.
Therefore, by employing non-i.i.d. noise, it is still possible to
keep the same privacy level along with longer duration; we
will discuss this in the next subsection.
The above discussions are based on the minimum or max-
imum eigenvalue of the strong input observability Gramian.
For more detailed privacy (strong input observability) analysis,
each eigenvalue and the associated eigen-space can be used
as typically done for the standard observability Gramian. Let
vi ∈ Rn+(T+1)m, i = 1, . . . , n + (T + 1)m be eigenvectors
of Ot,T associated with eigenvalues λi ≤ λi+1. If there is k
such that λk ≪ λk+1, then (x0, UT ) ∈ span{vk+1, . . . , vT }
is relatively easy to observe. Especially, if 0 < λk+1, then
such (x0, UT ) can be uniquely determined, and the projection
of span{vk+1, . . . , vT } onto the (x0, u(0))-space gives the
strongly input observable subspace. For the (non-strong) input
observability with known initial state (i.e., left invertibility),
the input observable and unobservable subspaces have been
studied based on an extension of Kalman’s canonical decom-
position [44], but quantitative analysis has not been established
yet.
The quantitative analysis of subspaces can be used for de-
signing noise to make a system more private. Let λk ≪ λk+1,
and consider the projection of span{vk+1, . . . , vT } onto the
(x0, u(0))-space, which we denote by X × U ⊂ Rn × Rm.
Then, the output of the system is sensitive for the initial states
and inputs in X × U . In other words, such initial states and
inputs are less private. In order to protect less private input
information, one can directly add noise v ∈ X×U to the initial
state and the input channel instead of the output channel. This
motivates us studying differential privacy with input noise.
C. Differential Privacy With Input Noise
In the previous subsection, we mention the idea of adding
noise to the input channel. The privacy level of the input data
is intuitively clearer rather than adding noise to the output
channel. In contrast, the intuition of output data utility may get
lost. Furthermore, differential privacy analysis is technically
more involved because the output variables are not necessarily
non-degenerate (while they are Gaussian if input noise is
Gaussian). In order to address this issue, even though artificial,
some technical procedure is required, which is essentially
equivalent to selecting a different base measure using the
disintegration theorem.
In order to proceed with analysis, we assume that the
system (1) is strongly input observable, i.e., the matrix in (14)
has the column full rank for any T ≥ n and t ≥ T +n, which
implicitly implies (t + T + 1)q ≥ n + (t+ 1)m. Then, there
exists a (t+T +1)q− (n+(t+1)m) by (t+T +1)q matrix
N t,T such that
rank N t = (t+ T + 1)q,[
Ot Nt,T
]⊤
N t,T = 0, (20)
N t :=
[
Ot Nt,T N t,T
]
. (21)
Remark 2.15: If a system is strongly input unobservable,
i.e., (14) does not hold, then one can use the singular value
decomposition of
[
Ot Nt,T
]
for similar analysis. ⊳
Now, we consider the following system with the initial state,
input and output noises,{
x(t+ 1) = Ax(t) +B(u(t) + v(t)), x(0) = x0 + vx
yv(t) = Cx(t) +D(u(t) + v(t)) + vd(t),
(22)
where the output noise vd is generated by the dummy vari-
ables V d,t,T ∈ R(t+T+1)q−(n+(t+1)m) as[
vd(0); vd(1); · · · ; vd(t)
]
= N t,TV d,t,T . (23)
The reason we call them the dummy variables is that V d,t,T
does not affect the differential privacy level, which will be
explained later. By recalling the symbol of a sequence in the
notation part of the introduction, define
V t :=
[
vx; Vt; V d,t,T
]
∈ R(t+1)q. (24)
From (21) and (24), for v(τ) = 0, τ > T , the output sequence
Yv,t ∈ R(t+1)q can be described by
Yv,t = Ot(x0 + vx) +Nt(Ut + VT ) +N t,TV d,t,T
= Otx0 +NtUt +N tV t. (25)
We study the connection between the differential privacy
levels of mechanisms (5) and (25). The important fact is that
the numbers of the elements of Wt and V t are the same, and
from (21), N t is non-singular. For mechanisms (5) and (25),
the generated output sequences are the same if and only if
Wt = N tV t. Therefore, the designs of the noises Wt and V t
are equivalent problems. In the previous subsection, we have
studied the differential privacy of the Gaussian mechanism (5).
Similarly, for the Gaussian mechanism (25), we have the
following corollary of Theorem 2.5.
Corollary 2.16: Let T ≥ n and t ≥ T + n. Also let
V t ∼ N(t+1)q(µ, diag{Σ1,Σ2}) be a non-degenerate multi-
variate Gaussian noise, where Σ1 ∈ R(n+(T+1)m)×(n+(T+1)m)
is the covariance matrix of the initial state and input noise
[vx;Vt], and Σ2 is that of the dummy variable V d,t,T . Then,
the Gaussian mechanism (25) induced by the strongly input
observable system (1) and V t is (ε, δ)-differentially private for
Adjcp((x
1
0, U
1
t ), (x
2
0, U
2
t )) such that u
1(τ) = u2(τ), T < τ ≤ t
at a finite time t if the covariance matrix Σ1 is chosen such
that
λ
1/2
min(Σ1) ≥ cR(ε, δ). (26)
Proof: Instead of (7), one has
λ−1/2max
([
Ot Nt,T
]⊤
N
−⊤
t Σ
−1
N
−1
t
[
Ot Nt,T
])
≥ cR(ε, δ)
From (21) and (20), it follows that[
Ot Nt,T
]⊤
N
−⊤
t Σ
−1
N
−1
t
[
Ot Nt,T
]
= Σ
−1
1 .
Therefore, (26) holds.
Corollary 2.16 concludes that the differential privacy level
only depends on the covariance Σ1 of the input noise [vx;VT ],
i.e., the differential privacy level does not depend on the
system. The covariance Σ1 gives an intuitive interpretation of
the privacy level of the input. Therefore, Corollary 2.14 can
help understanding the interpretation of values (ε, δ) from the
perspective of the privacy level of the input.
In Corollary 2.14 and Theorem 2.16, the differential privacy
levels of both mechanisms are the same if
OΣ,t,T =
[
Ot Nt
]⊤
Σ−1
[
Ot Nt
]
= Σ
−1
1 , (27)
where we recall (17) for the first equality; the converse is
not true in general since differential privacy only evaluates
the maximum eigenvalues. Therefore, adding the Gaussian
noise with the covariance Σ to the output of the system (1) is
equivalent to adding the the Gaussian noise with the covariance
O−1Σ,t,T to the input of the system (1) under the strong input
observability assumption.
In the previous subsection, we mentioned that the privacy
level of the mechanism (5) with i.i.d. output noise Σ =
σI(t+1)q decreases with the growth of duration. In contrast,
if one adds noise to the initial state and input channel,
the privacy level of a mechanism does not depend on the
duration because one can directly decide the distribution of the
estimated initial state and input sequence. These two facts do
not contradict each other if one allows to add non-i.i.d output
noise. From (27) adding suitable non-i.i.d. noise to the output
channel has a similar effect as adding noise to the initial state
and input channel. Therefore, adding non-i.i.d. noise is a key
factor for keeping the same privacy level against the duration
when one adds noise to the output channel.
Finally, the reason that the dummy variables V d,t,T do not
affect the differential privacy level can be explained based on
the least square estimation problems of the initial state and
input sequence. For a strongly input observable system, the
solution to the following least square estimation problem
J (x0,UT ) = min
(x0,UT )∈Rn×R(T+1)m
|Yv,t −Otx0 −Nt,TUT |
2
2
is, from (14), (20), and (25),[
xˆ0
UˆT
]
= O−1t,T
[
Ot Nt,T
]⊤
Yv,t =
[
x0
UT
]
+
[
vx
VT
]
.
The least square estimation is the actual initial state and
input sequence plus the noise added to them. Because of the
condition (20), the dummy variable V d,t,T is canceled. This is
the reason that the dummy variable does not affect differential
privacy analysis.
III. DIFFERENTIALLY PRIVATE CONTROLLERS
A. Motivating Example
We start with a motivating example. Consider DC micro-
grids [45] with smart meters given by
LiI˙i(t) = −RiIi(t)− Vi(t) + ui(t), Ii(t) := It,i(t)− IL,i,
CiV˙i(t) = Ii(t)−
∑
j∈Ni
Ii,j(t),
Li,j I˙i,j(t) = (Vi(t)− Vj(t)) −Ri,jIi,j(t),
yi,1(t) = Vi(t), yi,2(t) = Ii(t), (28)
where It,i(t) ∈ R, Vi(t) > 0, and Ii,j(t) ∈ R denote the
generator current, load voltage, the current between nodes i
and j, respectively, and IL,i ∈ R denote the load current,
which can be viewed as a constant in the time scale of
controller design. The parameters Li, Li,j , Ri, Ri,j , Ci > 0
denote inductances, resistances, and capacitance, respectively.
The set of neighbors of node i is denoted by Ni, and the
number of the neighbors is denoted by ni. For analysis and
controller design, we use its zero-order-hold discretization,
since each output information is collected and sent to the
power company digitally.
One objective of the power company is to maintain the
stability of the system by keeping Vi(t) to the prescribed
value V ∗ and the difference between the generator current
(i.e. supply) and load current (i.e. demand) It,i(t) to zero.
Therefore, the control objective is
lim
t→∞ Vi(t) = V
∗, lim
t→∞ Ii(t) = 0. (29)
Owing to developments of IoT technologies, smart meters
are becoming more widely available, which can be used to
monitor and send the value of Ii(t)(= It,i(t) − IL,i) to the
power company online. However, the load current IL,i is
determined by each user and thus contains the information
of each user’s personal life style. Therefore, the introduction
of a smart meter can lead to the privacy issue against the
power company in the sense of static data sets, which can be
studied in the static differential privacy framework as in [17].
On the other hand, our observations in the previous section
indicate the possibility that a user can identify the other users’
consumptions from the dynamical control input data sets ui(t).
Since this latter dynamic privacy issue depends on controller
dynamics, in this section, we consider to design a tracking
controller by taking privacy into account.
In the following subsections, first we summarize the stan-
dard result for tracking controller design based on the inter-
nal model principle. Then, we impose a differential privacy
requirement for a tracking controller. Finally, we shift our
ground and consider to identify the information of yp from
the state space model of the controller and published up. This
may provide observations for making the estimation problem
more difficult, i.e. for protecting private information further.
B. Tracking Problems
Consider the following plant{
xp(t+ 1) = Apxp(t) +Bpup(t),
yp(t) = Cpxp(t) +Dpup(t),
(30)
where xp(t) ∈ Rnp , up(t) ∈ Rmp and yp(t) ∈ Rqp denote
the state, input and output, respectively, and Ap ∈ R
np×np ,
Bp ∈ Rnp×mp , Cp ∈ Rqp×np and Dp ∈ Rqp×mp .
The first objective is to design an output feedback controller,
which achieves yp → yr as t → ∞ for a given reference
output yr(t) ∈ Rqp . Suppose that the reference output yr(t) is
generated by the following exosystem:{
xr(t+ 1) = Arxr(t), xr(0) = xr,0 ∈ Rnr ,
yr(t) = Crxr(t),
(31)
where xr(t) ∈ Rnr and yr(t) ∈ Rqr ; Ar ∈ Rnr×nr and
Cr ∈ Rqr×nr . Then, the composite system consisting of the
plant (30) and exosystem (31) is{
x¯(t+ 1) = A¯x¯(t) + B¯up(t),
e(t) = yp(t)− yr(t) = C¯x¯(t) +Dpup(t),
x¯ :=
[
xp
xr
]
, A¯ :=
[
Ap 0
0 Ar
]
, B¯ :=
[
Bp
0
]
,
C¯ :=
[
Cp −Cr
]
.
Our control objective can be rewritten as limt→∞ e(t) = 0.
As an output feedback controller, the following observer based
stabilizing controller is typically used{
up(t) = Gxc(t),
xc(t+ 1) = Acxc(t)− Le(t),
(32)
Ac := A¯+ LC¯ + (B¯ + LDp)G,
where G = [G1 G2] ∈ Rmp×(np+nr) and L = [L⊤1 L
⊤
2 ]
⊤ ∈
R
(np+nr)×qp are design parameters. The tracking problem is
solvable by the above dynamic output feedback controller
under the following standard assumptions [30].
Assumption 3.1: The matrix Ar has no eigenvalue in the
interior of the unit circle. ⊳
Assumption 3.2: The pair (Ap, Bp) is stabilizable. ⊳
Assumption 3.3: The pair (C¯, A¯) is detectable. ⊳
Assumption 3.4: The following two equations:
XAr = ApX +BpU,
0 = CpX +DpU − Cr ,
have a pair of solutions X ∈ Rnp×nr and U ∈ Rmp×nr . ⊳
Remark 3.5: Assumption 3.4 guarantees that for any given
xr(t) generated by (31), there exist xp,s(t) and up,s(t) simul-
taneously satisfying (30) and e(t) = yp(t)− yr(t) = 0 for all
t ∈ Z+. Assumption 3.1 guarantees such xp,s(t) and up,s(t)
uniquely exist; this assumption is for the ease of discussion
and is not necessarily to be imposed as mentioned in [30]. ⊳
Under Assumption 3.4, the tracking problem is solvable if
the closed-loop system consisting of the plant (30) and the
controller (32) is asymptotically stable. From the separation
principle, the closed loop system can be made asymptotically
stable by finding a pair ofG1 and L that make both Ap+BpG1
and A¯ + LC¯ asymptotically stable, respectively. Then, G2
can be designed as G2 = U − G1X for U and X in
Assumption 3.4.
C. Privacy Requirements for Controllers
We consider to design controller dynamics (i.e. G1 and L)
in order to prevent the information of yp (the set of Ii(t)
in the motivating example) from being identified from up
(the set of ui(t) in the motivating example). As mentioned
in the previous section, adding sufficiently large noise always
achieves the prescribed privacy level. However, large noise can
change a control input significantly. Therefore, it is desirable
to design a controller which becomes highly private by adding
small noise. According to Theorem 2.9, such a controller has
a small H∞-norm.
Remark 3.6: One may consider controller design from dif-
ferent perspectives. Based on Theorem 2.5, differential privacy
analysis itself is possible for an unstable controller. However,
this theorem does not give a clear indication on how to choose
design parameters G1 and L1. On the other hand, if a strongly
input unobservable controller is designed, the information in
the strongly input unobservable space is protected without
adding noise as mentioned in Section II-B. However, from
Theorem 2.12, this reduces to a rank constraint problem that is
difficult to solve in general as the rank minimization problem
is known to be NP-hard [46]. Therefore, we consider to design
a controller having a small H∞-norm. ⊳
Remark 3.7: In Theorem 2.9, the differential privacy level
also depends on the standard observability Gramian of the ini-
tial state. However, it is not straightforward to simultaneously
specify the maximum eigenvalues of the observability Gramian
and H∞-norm. In fact, it is known that the maximum Hankel
singular value, the square root of the maximum eigenvalue of
the product of the controllability and observability Gramians
is bounded by the H∞-norm [47]. Therefore, making H∞-
norm small can result in making the maximum eigenvalue of
the observability Gramian small. ⊳
Remark 3.8: Even if one adds different noise from the
Gaussian noise such as the Laplace noise as in Remark 2.8,
making H∞-norm small can increase the differential pri-
vacy level. Making H∞-norm small can result in making
λ
1/2
max([ Ot Nt ]⊤[ Ot Nt ]) small. Then, from the equiv-
alence of the norm, any matrix induced norm of [ Ot Nt ]
becomes small. Therefore, from Remark 2.8, the differential
privacy level increases also for the Laplace mechanism. ⊳
In general, a controller having a bounded H∞-norm is
needed to be asymptotically stable. Unfortunately, stable con-
troller design is not always possible because of its structure
in (32).
Proposition 3.9: Under Assumptions 3.1-3.4, the con-
troller (32) solving the linear output regulation problem is not
asymptotically stable if Dp = 0.
Proof: Assumption 3.4, (32), and G2 = U −G1X yield
 λInp −Ap −BpG1 −BpG20 λInr −Ar
Cp −Cr

[ X
In−r
]
=

 λX −ApX −BpUλInr −Ar
CpX − Cr

 =

 X(λInr −Ar)λInr −Ar
−DpU

 .
If Dp = 0, this becomes zero when λ is an eigenvalue of
Ar. Therefore, for the pair (C¯, A¯ + B¯G), any eigenvalue
of Ar is not observable. That is, the set of eigenvalues of
Ac contains that of Ar, which are marginally stable according
to Assumption 3.1.
If Dp 6= 0, one can use the output regulation controller (32)
addressing the privacy requirement. However, there are plenty
of systems for which Dp = 0. In order to deal with these
systems, we modify the output regulation controller (32) in
the next subsection.
D. Controller Design with Privacy Concern
In order to address the case Dp = 0, we consider to design
the following controller dynamics:{
x¯c(t+ 1) = A¯cx¯c(t) + (Bp + L1Dp)G2xr(t)− L1yp(t),
up(t) = G1x¯c(t) +G2xr(t),
A¯c := Ap +BpG1 + L1(Cp +DpG1). (33)
The difference from the previous controller (32) is to use the
actual state xr of the exosystem (31) instead of its estimation.
Since we do not need to estimate xr, the new controller can
have better control performance than the previous one.
Private tracking controller design requires the following
three for the new controller parameters G1 and L1:
1) Ap +BpG1 is asymptotically stable;
2) Ap + L1Cp is asymptotically stable;
3) Given γ > 0, the H∞-norm of the controller (33) from
yp to up is bounded as
‖ −G1(zInp+nr − A¯c)
−1L1‖H∞ ≤ γ. (34)
As mentioned in the previous subsection, the third condition
implicitly requires the stability of the new controller (33).
Stabilization of a plant by a stable controller is called strong
stabilization. Its necessary and sufficient condition is described
in terms of a parity interlacing property (PIP) of the transfer
function matrix [48]. However, the PIP condition does not pro-
vide a controller design method. For continuous-time systems,
the papers [49], [50] provide ways of designing controller
satisfying Condition 3) based on the LMI. We employ one
of these methods.
It is not easy to simultaneously finding G1 and L1 satis-
fying all three conditions; the reason will be explained later.
Therefore, first, we find G1 stabilizing Ap+BpG1, which can
be done by multiple methods under Assumption 3.2. Then, we
consider to find L1 satisfying 2) and 3) as follows.
Lemma 3.10: Suppose that G1 is chosen such that Ap +
BpG1 is asymptotically stable. If there exist P ∈ R
np×np and
Lˆ1 ∈ Rnp×qp satisfying the following LMIs:[
P PAp + Lˆ1Cp
(PAp + Lˆ1Cp)
⊤ P
]
≻ 0, (35)
and 

P 0 P 13 G
⊤
1
0 γ2Iqp −Lˆ
⊤
1 0
P
⊤
13 −Lˆ1 P 0
G1 0 0 Imp

 ≻ 0, (36)
P
⊤
13 := P (Ap +BpG1) + Lˆ1(Cp +DpG1),
then Ap + L1Cp with L1 := P
−1Lˆ1 is asymptotically stable,
and (34) holds.
Proof: If (35) holds, Ap+L1Cp is asymptotically stable.
Next, (36) implies (34) [51, Theorem 4.6.6].
Remark 3.11: For any given G1 stabilizing Ap + BpG1,
it is possible to verify if there exist P , L1, and γ > 0
satisfying (34) by replacing (36) with[
P P 13
P
⊤
13 P
]
≻ 0. (37)
That is, given G1, the LMIs (35) and (37) have a solution P
if and only if strong stabilization is achievable. ⊳
An alternative way of controller design is to find Lˆ1
satisfying 2) and then to use similar LMIs for finding G1
that satisfies 1) and 3) simultaneously. If one tries to find G1
and Lˆ1 at the same time, then one encounters BMIs, e.g. there
is a cross term of G1 and P or G1 and Lˆ1 in P 13 in (36).
BMIs are more difficult to handle than LMIs, since a BMI
describes those sets that are not necessary convex.
E. Differentially Private Controllers
For differential private controller design, one can add noise
to the output up or the input yp of the controller. As clarified
in Corollary 2.16, the differential privacy level with input
Gaussian noise only depends on the covariance matrix of the
noise. For output Gaussian noise, we obtain the following
theorem by combining Corollary 2.9 and Lemma 3.10. Since
the proof directly follows, it is omitted.
Theorem 3.12: Consider the controller dynamics (33) sat-
isfying the requirements 1)–3) with new output up(t) +w(t),
where w(t) ∈ Rmp is noise. Then, the Gaussian mechanism
induced by the controller dynamics andWt ∼ N(t+1)mp(µ,Σ)
is (ε, δ)-differentially private for Adjc2((x
1
0, U
1
t ), (x
2
0, U
2
t )) at
a finite time t with ε > 0 and 1/2 > δ > 0 if the
covariance matrix Σ ≻ 0 is chosen such that (12) holds for
(A,B,C,D) = (A¯c,−L1, G1, 0). ⊳
In summary, the differentially private controller is designed
as follows. First, one designs the controller dynamics (33)
based on the LMIs (35) and (36) and then noise w based on the
above theorem with (12). In the LMIs, the design parameters
reduce to γ, the H∞-norm of the controller (33).
From (12) (and Remark 3.7), a smaller γ gives a smaller
lower bound on the covariance matrix of the Gaussian noise,
but making γ small may result in deterioration of the control
performance. Moreover, adding noise w may result in deterio-
ration of the control performance also. Let H(z) andK(z) de-
note the transfer functions of the plant (30) and controller (33),
respectively. The transfer function matrices of the closed-loop
system from w to y is (I−H(z)K(z))−1P (z). If the controller
is designed such that K(z) is sufficiently large, the output y
of the closed-loop system is less influenced by w. In contrast,
this causes the decline in the privacy level. Therefore, there is
a trade-off between the control performance and the privacy
level for the differentially private controller design.
If one additionally requires the H∞-norm of the closed-
loop system not to be greater than γ¯ > 0, then one can use
the following LMI:

Q 0 0 ∗ ∗ ∗
0 P 0 ∗ ∗ ∗
0 0 γ¯2Iqp ∗ ∗ ∗
QAp QBpG1 QBp Q 0 0
−Lˆ1Cp P
⊤
25 −Lˆ1Dp 0 P 0
Cp DpG1 Dp 0 0 Imp


≻ 0, (38)
P
⊤
25 = P (Ap +BpG1) + Lˆ1Cp,
where ∗ are suitable elements to make the matrix symmetric.
The H∞-norms of the controller and closed-loop system are
made less than γ and γ¯, respectively, if LMIs (35), (36)
and (38) have solutions P , Q, and Lˆ1.
F. Private Data Estimation
In this subsection, we shift our ground and consider to
estimate yp(t) from up(t) and the controller dynamics (32)
under noise. For the state estimation, one can use the standard
techniques of the optimal linear filters or smoothers. Thus, we
reformulate the input estimation problem as a state estimation
problem inspired by unknown input observer design [52], [53].
Suppose that the designed controller (33) is strongly input
observable for the output up and input yp. Recall the symbols
for sequences Up,2n(t) and Yp,2n(t) in the notation part of the
introduction. In a similar manner as (2), the output sequence
Up,t of the controller can be described as
Up,2n(t) = O2nx¯c(t) +N2nYp,2n(t) +Nr,2nXr,2n(t), (39)
where A = A¯c, B = −L1, C = G1, and D = 0 for O2n and
N2n, and Nr,t denotes Nt for A = A¯c, B = (Bp+L1Dp)G2,
C = G1, and D = G2.
From (13), there exist a (not necessarily unique) matrixK ∈
R
(n+(n+1)m)×(2n+1)q such that
K
[
O2n N2n,n
]
= In+(n+1)m. (40)
By using this K , define
Kx :=
[
In 0
]
K,
Ku :=
[
0 Im 0
]
K.
Then, from (39),
Kx(Up,2n −Nr,2nXr,2n)
=
[
In 0
]
K
[
O2n N2n,n
] [ x¯c(0)
Yp,n
]
=
[
In 0
] [ x¯c(0)
Yp,n
]
= x¯c(0), (41)
and
Ku(Up,2n(t)−Nr,2nXr,2n(t))
=
[
0 Im 0
] [ x¯c(t)
Yp,n(t)
]
= yp(t), (42)
By substituting them into (33), we have

up(t) = G1x¯c(t) +G2xr(t),
x¯c(t+ 1) = A¯cx¯c(t) + (Bp + L1Dp)G2xr(t)
−L1Ku(Up,2n(t)−Nr,2nXr,2n(t)),
x¯c(0) = Kx(Up,2n −Nr,2nXr,2n),
(43)
where recall that the state of exosystem xr is a piece of public
information. This system corresponds to a left inverse system
of the controller. In order to estimate yp from up, one can
use the state estimation of this model with the process and
measurement noises v˜(t) ∈ R(2n+1)mp and w˜(t) ∈ Rmp .
Let x˜c(t) denote the state estimation of (43). Then, define
u˜p(t) = G1x˜c(t) +G2xr(t).
Finally from (42) and U˜p,2n(t), the estimation of yp(t) denoted
by y˜p(t) can be computed as
y˜p(t) = Ku(U˜p,2n(t)−Nr,2nXr,2n(t)). (44)
It is worth mentioning that in (43), future information of
up(t), namely Up,2n(t) is used in order to estimate yp(t).
In other words, at time t, one can estimate the historic data
yp(t−2n), and thus the private data estimation can be formu-
lated as a smoothing problem. There are several techniques
for designing filters or smoothers such as the Kalman filter
or smoother, and one of them can be employed for the state
estimation. Typically, for the filtering and smoothing problems,
i.i.d. Gaussian noises are used as the process and measurement
noises. Therefore, adding non-i.i.d. or non-Gaussian noises
to the differentially private controller could be useful for
protecting the private data than adding i.i.d. Gaussian noises.
The above is one approach to input data estimation. For
strongly input observable systems, one can directly esti-
mate (x0, u(0)) from Yt and the probability density function of
noise by extending the results in [54]. The paper [54] further
develops an updating algorithm of the estimation forward in
time.
IV. EXAMPLES
We revisit the DC microgrids (28) with parameters in [45]
for i = 1, 2, where Ri = 0.2[Ω], Ri,j = 70[mΩ], Li =
1.8[mH], and Ci = 2.2[mF] and design a differentially private
controller, where the sampling period is 10−3[s]. We consider
that originally Ii = 0[A] and Vi = 380[V] are achieved
with I1,2 = 0[A]. Then the user 1 starts to use more electricity,
which causes I1 = −4[A]. The goal is to achieve Ii = 0[A]
and Vi = 380[V] again by protecting the information that
user 1 changes its electricity consumption against user 2.
From the control objective (29), the exosystem (31) is given
by Ar = Cr = I4. In this problem setting, Assumptions 3.1-
3.4 hold.
We consider to design a differentially private tracking
controller. First, we design G1 stabilizing Ap + BpG1 based
on the following optimal control problem:
J =
∞∑
t=0
|xp(t)|
2
2 + |up(t)|
2
2.
Solving the corresponding Riccati equation, G1 is obtained as
G1 =
[
−0.850 0.037 −0.0461 −0.0007 0.229
0.0370 −0.850 −0.0007 −0.0461 −0.229
]
.
WithX and U in Assumption 3.4,G2 = U−G1X is computed
as
G2 =
[
0.869 −0.0019 0.873 0.174
−0.0019 0.869 0.174 0.873
]
.
Second, the LMIs (35) and (36) have solutions P and Lˆ1
for γ = 0.365. The matrix L1 = P
−1Lˆ1 is
L1 =


−0.193 0.0088 0.0828 0.0111
0.0088 −0.193 0.0111 0.0828
−0.0717 0.0072 −0.134 −0.0129
0.0072 −0.0717 −0.0129 −0.134
0.0253 −0.0253 −0.0504 0.0504

 .
In this scenario, the initial state of the controller is chosen
as [0 0 380 380 0] because the state of the controller takes
this value when the control objective is achieved.
Suppose that each user adds Gaussian noise to Ii and Vi
before sending them to the power company. Based on our
observation for input observability, we design input noises
from the principal components of N⊤10,5N10,5 of the controller,
where the initial state of the controller is assumed to be
a piece of public information. Its eigenvalues are shown in
Fig. 1. Let vj,i be the projection of the normalized eigenvectors
1 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
Fig. 1. The value of each eigenvalue of N⊤
10,5
N10,5
-4
0
4
-4
0
4
375
380
385
375
380
385
-20
-18
-16
0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05
-20
-18
-16
Time [s]
I 1
I 2
V
2
V
1
u
1
u
2
without noise with noise
Fig. 2. The outputs and inputs of the closed-loop system controlled by the
differentially private controller
corresponding to the eigenvalue λj onto the ui(0)-space. By
using non-zero λj , we compute
40∑
j=21
λjv1,jv
⊤
1,j =
40∑
j=21
λjv2,jv
⊤
2,j =
[
0.0347 −0.0106
−0.0106 0.0129
]
.
Since larger λj characterizes less private information of ui(0),
it is reasonable to add larger noise to ui(0) corresponding to
larger λj . Therefore, we use the scaling by a positive constant
a, namely
Σ1 = a
[
0.0347 −0.0106
−0.0106 0.0129
]
as the covariance matrix of the input noise for each user. In
order to determine a, we choose the parameters of differential
privacy as ε = 0.3, δ = 0.47 and c = 1, then Q−1(δ) ≤ 0.1
and thus R(ε, δ) ≤ 1.47. For a = 251, the condition (26)
holds.
Figure 2 shows yp and up of the closed-loop system. If there
is no noise, the tracking error converges to zero. However,
the change of I1 affects cleary I2, V2, and u2. Therefore,
user 2 can estimate that user 1 starts to use more electricity.
In contrast, the designed differentially private controller masks
the effects caused by the electricity consumption of user 1
against user 2.
V. TOWARD NONLINEAR MECHANISMS
We consider to extend some of our results to nonlinear
mechanisms toward nonlinear differentially private controller
design. The output regulation and H∞-norm analysis are
extended to nonlinear systems at least locally; see e.g. [30],
[55]. Therefore, if differential privacy analysis is extended,
one can design a nonlinear differentially private controller at
least locally in a similar manner as the linear case. In this
section, we proceed with differential privacy analysis of the
Gaussian mechanism induced by a nonlinear dynamical system
and output Gaussian noise. For nonlinear dynamical systems,
even if Gaussian noise is added to the input channel, the output
variable is not Gaussian in general, and thus we do not analyze
the mechanisms induced by input noise.
A. Differential Privacy with Output Noise
Consider the following nonlinear discrete-time control sys-
tem with output noise{
x(t+ 1) = f(x(t), u(t)),
yw(t) = h(x(t), u(t)) + w(t),
(45)
where f : Rn × Rm → Rn and h : Rn × Rm → Rq are
continuous. Its solution x(t) starting from x0 controlled by
Ut−1 is denoted by φ(t, x0, Ut−1), where φ(0, x0, U−1) := x0.
The output sequence Yw,t can be described by
Yw,t = Ht(x0, Ut) +Wt, (46)
where Ht : R
n × R(t+1)m → R(t+1)q is
Ht(x0, Ut) :=


h(φ(0, x0, U−1), u(0))
h(φ(1, x0, U0), u(1))
...
h(φ(t, x0, Ut−1), u(t))

 . (47)
Now, we are ready to obtain an extension of Theorem 2.5
to the nonlinear Gaussian mechanism by using input data
dependent Gaussian noise.
Theorem 5.1: The Gaussian mechanism (46) induced by
Wt ∼ N(t+1)q(µ(x0, Ut),Σ(x0, Ut)) is (ε, δ)-differentially
private for Adjc2((x
1
0, U
1
t ), (x
2
0, U
2
t )) at a finite time t with
ε(x0, Ut) > 0 and 1/2 > δ(x0, Ut) > 0 if the covariance
matrix Σ(x0, Ut) ≻ 0 is chosen such that
1
sup|[x¯0;U¯t]|2≤c H¯t(x0, Ut, x¯0, U¯t)
≥ cR (ε(x0, Ut), δ(x0, Ut)) ,
(48)
H¯t(x0, Ut, x¯0, U¯t)
:= |Ht(x0 + x¯0, Ut + U¯t)−Ht(x0, Ut)|Σ−1(x0,Ut)
for any (x0, Ut) ∈ Rn × R(t+1)m.
Proof: In a similar manner as for Theorem 2.5, one
obtains (9) for
z = |Ht(x
1
0, U
1
t )−Ht(x
2
0, U
2
t )|
−1
Σ−1(x10,U
1
t )
. (49)
Define x¯0 = x
2
0 − x
1
0 and U¯t = U
2
t − U
1
t . Then,
Adjc2((x
1
0, U
1
t ), (x
2
0, U
2
t )) implies |[x¯0; U¯t]|2 ≤ c. It follows
that
z = H¯t(x0, Ut, x¯0, U¯t) ≤ sup
|[x¯0;U¯t]|2≤c
H¯t(x0, Ut, x¯0, U¯t),
for any ((x10, U
1
t ), (x
2
0, U
2
t )) ∈ Adj
c
2((x
1
0, U
1
t ), (x
2
0, U
2
t )).
Therefore, if (48) holds, (9) holds.
In a similar manner as Remark 2.8, for an i.i.d. Laplace
noise wi(t), i = 1, . . . , q, t ∈ Z+ with variance µ(x0, Ut) ∈ R
and distribution b(x0, Ut) > 0, the mechanism (46) is (ε, 0)-
differentially private for Adjc1((x
1
0, U
1
t ), (x
2
0, U
2
t )) at a finite
time t with ε > 0 if
b(x0, Ut) ≥ sup
|[x¯0;U¯t]|1≤c
∣∣Ht(x0 + x¯0, Ut + U¯t)−Ht(x0, Ut)∣∣1
ε(x0, Ut)
(50)
for any (x0, Ut) ∈ R
n × R(t+1)m. Furthermore, suppose that
f and h are smooth. Let γ(s) = x0 + s(x¯0 − x0) and ν(s) =
Ut + s(U¯t − Ut) for s ∈ [0, 1]. Then,∣∣Ht(x0 + x¯0, Ut + U¯t)−Ht(x0, Ut)∣∣1
=
∣∣∣∣
∫ 1
0
∂Ht(γ(s), ν(s))
∂(x0, Ut)
[
x0
Ut
]
ds
∣∣∣∣
1
≤ c
∣∣∣∣
∫ 1
0
∂Ht(γ(s), ν(s))
∂(x0, Ut)
ds
∣∣∣∣
1
≤ c sup
(x0,Ut)∈Rn×R(t+1)m
∣∣∣∣∂Ht(x0, Ut)∂(x0, Ut)
∣∣∣∣
1
.
Therefore, (50) holds if
b(x0, Ut) ≥
c
ε(x0, Ut)
sup
(x0,Ut)∈Rn×R(t+1)m
∣∣∣∣∂Ht(x0, Ut)∂(x0, Ut)
∣∣∣∣
1
.
Note that in the linear case ∂Ht(x0, Ut)/∂(x0, Ut) is nothing
but the matrix [ Ot Nt ].
For Laplacian noise, differential privacy is characterized by
the matrix ∂Ht(x0, Ut)/∂(x0, Ut). This matrix has a strong
connection with the local strong input observability of the
nonlinear system (45); the concept of strong observability
can be extended to nonlinear systems as done for local
observability [56] based on the distinguishability of a pair
of initial states and initial inputs. In fact, one can derive a
necessary and sufficient condition for local strong input ob-
servability in terms of the differential one-forms corresponding
to ∂Ht(x0, Ut)/∂(x0, Ut) as follows: there exists t ∈ Z+ such
that
span{dHt(x0, Ut)} ∩ span{dx, du0} = span{dx, du0}
under the constant dimensional assumption for all (x0, Ut) ∈
R
n × R(t+1)q; see e.g. [56] for similar discussions for local
observability. This is an extension of the condition (40). In
contrast to the qualitative criterion for strong input observ-
ability, it is still not straightforward to extend the concept of
Gramians, both a qualitative and quantitative criterion. In fact,
there is no clear extension of Gramians to nonlinear systems
even for controllability and observability although the concept
of controllability and observability and their corresponding
energy functions have been extended [56]–[58].
B. For Incrementally Input-to-Output Stable Systems
In Section II-A, we mention that the H∞-norm gives an
upper bound of the differential privacy level. This observation
is helpful for differentially private controller design. In this
subsection, we consider to extend this result to the nonlinear
case based on the concept of the incremental input-to-output
stability (IOS).
For a nonlinear system, there are several ways of defining
its gain or called estimation; e.g. see [59]. Especially, L2 →
L2 estimation is extended to nonlinear systems as input-to-
state stability (ISS) [59] that is also extended to incremental
properties by [60]. Incremental ISS can be readily extended to
input-to-output operators, discrete-time systems, and arbitrary
Lp → Lp estimations as follows. In Appendix, we give its
Lyapunov characterization.
Definition 5.2: A nonlinear system (45) is said to be in-
crementally IOS (with respect to the p-norm) if the output
h(φ(t, x0, Ut−1), u(t)) exists for all t ∈ Z+, for any x0 ∈ Rn
and u : Z+ → Rm, and there exist class K functions α and γ
such that
t∑
τ=0
|h(φ(τ, x10, U
1
t−1), u
1(t))− h(φ(τ, x20, U
2
t−1), u
2(t))|p
≤ α(|x10 − x
2
0|p) +
t∑
τ=0
γ(|u1(τ)− u2(τ)|p), t ∈ Z+ (51)
for any (x10, x
2
0) ∈ R
n × Rn and (U1t , U
2
t ) ∈ R
(t+1)m ×
R
(t+1)m. ⊳
In fact, α and γ do not necessarily to belong class K for
differential privacy analysis, and non-negative functions are
enough. In order to connect differential privacy analysis with
ISS, we consider class K functions.
In the linear case, as shown in Corollary 2.9, the H∞-norm
can be used for designing the Gaussian noise. Now, we obtain
an extension of Corollary 2.9 to the nonlinear IOS system
based on Theorem 5.1. The proof directly follows, and thus is
omitted.
Corollary 5.3: Let Wt ∼ N(t+1)q(µ(x0, Ut),Σ(x0, Ut))
be a non-degenerate multivariate Gaussian noise. Then, the
Gaussian mechanism (46) induced by an incrementally IOS
nonlinear system (45) (with respect to 2-norm) is (ε, δ)-
differentially private for Adjc2((x
1
0, U
1
t ), (x
2
0, U
2
t )) at a finite
time t with ε(x0, Ut) > 0 and 1/2 > δ(x0, Ut) > 0 if the
covariance matrix Σ(x0, Ut) ≻ 0 is chosen such that
λ
1/2
min(Σ(x0, Ut))
≥ (α(c) + (t+ 1)γ(c))R (ε(x0, Ut), δ(x0, Ut))
for any x0 ∈ Rn and Ut ∈ R(t+1)m. ⊳
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied differential privacy of
Gaussian mechanisms induced by discrete-time linear systems.
First, we have analyzed differential privacy in terms of strong
input observability and then have clarified that the differential
privacy level is characterized by the maximum eigenvalue of
the input observability Gramian. In other words, small noise is
enough to make the less input observable Gaussian mechanism
highly differentially private. Moreover, we have shown that
the mechanisms induced by input and output noises have
the same differentially privacy level for suitable covariance
matrices. Next, we have developed a differentially private
dynamic controller design method, which can be highly private
by adding small noise. Finally, we have briefly mentioned
differential privacy analysis of incrementally IOS nonlinear
systems.
Although we have focused on differential privacy in this pa-
per, our analysis and controller design can be tools for studying
more general privacy issues of control systems. Differential
privacy has been originally proposed in static data analysis,
and one may extend this concept to dynamical systems further
or develop new privacy concepts for dynamical systems. For
differentially private controller design, an updating method for
the covariance matrix of noise forward in time is practically
useful. We are also interested in this direction of research
based on the idea of Kalman filter design.
In general, measurement and input noises, disturbance and
model error make analysis and controller design difficult and
deteriorate the control performance, and thus they are regarded
as troubles. However, they increase the privacy level. There-
fore, the privacy analysis reduces to the trade-off between
these factors.
Acknowledgement: We thank Dr. Michele Cucuzzella, Uni-
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APPENDIX
In this appendix, we provide a sufficient condition for
incremental IOS.
Theorem A: A nonlinear system (45) is incrementally IOS
if there exist a continuous function V : Rn × Rn → R+,
constants c1 > 0, λ ∈ (0, 1), class K functions σ1, σ2, and a
class K∞ function α2 such that
c1|h(x
1
0, u)− h(x
2
0, v)|p ≤ V (x
1
0, x
2
0) + σ1(|u
1 − u2|p), (52)
V (x10, x
2
0) ≤ α2(|x
1
0 − x
2
0|p), (53)
V (f(x10, u
1), f(x20, u
2)) ≤ λV (x10, x
2
0) + σ2(|u
1 − u2|p) (54)
for any (x10, x
2
0) ∈ R
n × Rn and (u1, u2) ∈ Rm × Rm.
Proof: Recursively using inequality (54) for τ ≥ 1 yields
V (φ(τ, x10, U
1
τ−1), φ(τ, x
2
0, U
2
τ−1))
≤ λV (φ(τ − 1, x10, U
1
τ−2), φ(τ − 1, x
2
0, U
2
τ−2))
+ σ(|u1(τ − 1)− u2(τ − 1)|p)
≤ λ2V (φ(τ − 2, x10, U
1
τ−3), φ(τ − 2, x
2
0, U
2
τ−3))
+ λσ2(|u
1(τ − 2)− u2(τ − 2)|p)
+ σ2(|u
1(τ − 1)− u2(τ − 1)|p)
≤ λτV (x10, x
2
0) +
τ−1∑
r=0
λτ−1−rσ2(|u1(r) − u2(r)|p).
From (52),
c1|h(φ(τ, x
1
0, U
1
τ−1, u
1(τ)) − h(φ(τ, x20, U
2
τ−1), u
2(τ))|p
≤ λτα2(|x
1
0 − x
2
0|p) +
τ−1∑
r=0
λτ−1−rσ2(|u1(r) − u2(r)|p)
+ σ1(|u
1(τ)− u2(τ)|p).
By taking the summation, we have
c1
t∑
τ=0
|h(φ(τ, x10, U
1
τ−1, u
1(τ)) − h(φ(τ, x20, U
2
τ−1), u
2(τ))|p
≤
t∑
τ=0
(
λτα2(|x
1
0 − x
2
0|p) + σ1(|u
1(τ) − u2(τ)|p)
+
τ−1∑
r=0
λτ−r−1σ2(|u1(r) − u2(r)|p)
)
≤
1− λt
1− λ
α2(|x
1
0 − x
2
0|p) +
t∑
τ=0
σ1(|u
1(τ) − u2(τ)|p)
+
t−1∑
r=0
1− λt−1−r
1− λ
σ2(|u
1(r) − u2(r)|p)
≤
α2(|x10 − x
2
0|p)
1− λ
+
t∑
r=0
(
σ2(|u1(r) − u2(r)|p)
1− λ
+ σ1(|u
1(τ)− u2(τ)|p)
)
,
where in the second last inequality, λ ∈ (0, 1) is used.
Therefore, the system is incrementally IOS.
Remark B: We mentioned that for differential privacy anal-
ysis, α and γ are required to be only non-negative functions.
In such a case, we obtain a similar characterization by using
non-negative functions σ1, σ2, and α2. ⊳
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